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 Most philosophers who study moral responsibility have done so in isolation of the 
concept of truth.  Here, I show that thinking about the nature of truth has profound consequences 
for discussions of moral responsibility.  In particular, by focusing on a very obvious fact about 
truth—that truth depends on the world and not the other way around—we can see that widely 
accepted alleged counterexamples to a key inference rule in an important incompatibilist 
argument can be shown not only to be unsuccessful, but also impossible.    
As it is usually understood in philosophical debate, to be morally responsible for 
something is to be either praiseworthy or blameworthy for it.  And this notion of moral 
responsibility is arguably a key feature of personhood and deeply important to our self-
understanding.  So, that we are, or that we can be, either praiseworthy or blameworthy for the 
things that we do is important to the way in which we view the type of creatures that we are.  We 
are, we think, moral creatures, after all.   
But now an important question.  Is moral responsibility compatible with the truth of 
causal determinism (where ‘causal determinism’ is “the thesis that there is at any instant exactly 
one physically possible future,” (van Inwagen, 1983, p.3))?  That is, could there be morally 
responsible agents in a causally determined universe?  Or could only nondeterministic universes 
feature morally responsible agency?  One of the most influential arguments that moral 
responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism is the so-called ‘Direct Argument,’ 
developed by Peter van Inwagen (1983).  The Direct Argument rests on the following two rules 
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of inference (where, ‘☐’ stands for broadly logical necessity; ‘⊃’ stands for material implication; 
and ‘NRp’ stands for ‘p and no-one is now or ever has been even partly morally responsible for 
p’): 
 Rule A:  From ☐p, we may infer NRp 
 
 Rule B:  From NRp and NR(p ⊃ q), we may infer NRq 
 To illustrate the Direct Argument, consider an individual, Colin, who decides to donate 
some money to charity.  Van Inwagen argues that, with these two rules of inference in hand and 
two very plausible premises, we can show that if Colin’s decision to donate to charity is causally 
determined, then it’s not something for which he is morally responsible.   
Here are the details of van Inwagen’s argument.  Assume, for conditional proof, that 
causal determinism is true.  From this assumption, we can reason as follows (where ‘C’ stands 
for Colin’s decision to donate money, ‘P’ labels a complete description of the world prior to the 
existence of any human person, and ‘L’ stands for a conjunction of the laws of nature): 
(1) ☐ (P & L ⊃ C)  By definition of ‘determinism’  
  
 (2) ☐ (P ⊃ (L ⊃ C))  1, and logic 
 
 (3) NR (P ⊃ (L ⊃ C))  2, and Rule A 
 
 (4)  NR P              Premise 
 
 (5)  NR (L ⊃ C)  From 3, 4, and Rule B 
 
 (6)  NR L   Premise 
 
 (7)  NR C   From 5, 6, and Rule B 
  
 In other words, if Colin’s decision to donate to charity is causally determined, then the 
past and the laws of nature jointly entail Colin’s decision at that time.  But since Colin is not 
morally responsible for the past prior to the existence of any human person and since he is not 
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morally responsible for the laws of nature, then—with Rules A and B in hand—we can conclude 
that he is not morally responsible for his present decision to donate to charity. 
 The Direct Argument is highly significant.  If it is successful, we have an argument for 
incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism that does not make use of two 
controversial claims typically invoked by incompatibilists: (i) a person is morally responsible for 
what she has done only if she could have done otherwise, and (ii) if the person’s action is 
causally determined, then she could not have done otherwise.  Since compatibilists typically 
deny one or the other of these claims, the Direct Argument offers an intriguing way to argue for 
incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism that sidesteps many of the traditional 
battlegrounds between compatibilists and incompatibilists.   
 In recent years, the Direct Argument has received a lot of critical attention, most of it 
paying special attention to the Argument’s inference rules, as well as some key metaphysical 
assumptions.  In particular, Rule B has come under the most fire from compatibilists wishing to 
disarm the Direct Argument.  This has happened in (at least) two ways.  First, and most 
prominently, compatibilists have leveled alleged counterexamples to Rule B in an attempt to 
show that the rule is invalid.  Second, compatibilists have leveled charges of dialectical 
impropriety with respect to Rule B.  It is the first challenge against Rule B—i.e. alleged 
counterexamples to the Rule—that I wish to focus on in this paper.  Specifically, I want to argue 
that if we reflect on the nature of truth, we will see that there’s good reason to think that 
counterexamples to Rule B are impossible.   
 If I am right that the nature of truth shows us that counterexamples to Rule B are 
impossible, such conclusion is important.  For, if Rule B is valid, then incompatibilism is true.  
Moreover, if Rule B is invalid, then there are possible cases that illustrate its falsity; that is, there 
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are counterexamples to the Rule.  So, it falls right out of my overall conclusion—viz., that an 
obvious fact about truth implies that there can’t be counterexamples to Rule B—that 
compatibilism commits its adherents to denying an obvious fact about truth.  That compatibilists 
must deny an obvious fact about truth is very surprising (and important) indeed! 
 To begin my defense of the claim that counterexamples to Rule B are impossible, I 
follow Trenton Merricks (2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b) by noting that truth depends (in a very 
trivial way) on the world.  It’s true, for example, that dogs bark because dogs bark; it’s true that 
Turner exists because I exist; that I write this paper at t is true because I write this paper at t, and 
so on.  No one should disagree with this “truism about truth” (Merricks, 2009, p. 31).  That is, no 
one should disagree that truth depends on the world in this trivial way.1   
 And I do not think anyone would disagree with this truism about truth.  But I think that 
reflection on this truism will reveal that any alleged counterexamples to Rule B must fail.  They 
must fail because it’s impossible to give a bona fide counterexample to Rule B given this truism 
about truth. 
 To begin to see why I say this, note that Merricks (2009, 2011a, 2011b) argues that the 
following is a corollary to the truism about truth (what I’ll call): 
Truth DependenceCHOICE [TDC]:  For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S has a 
choice about what p’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends on’ in which truth 
depends on the world), then S has a choice about p’s truth. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  isn’t	  to	  say	  that	  there’s	  nothing	  more	  substantive	  to	  say	  about	  the	  way	  truth	  depends	  on	  the	  world.	  	  One	  
might	  wonder,	  for	  example,	  how	  true	  counterfactuals	  can	  ‘depend	  on	  the	  world’.	  	  But	  I	  leave	  aside	  discussions	  of	  
such	  analyses	  of	  truth—e.g.	  Truthmaker	  theory,	  Correspondence	  theory,	  Truth	  Supervenes	  on	  Being	  (TSB)	  theory,	  
etc.—because	  a	  discussion	  of	  such	  analyses	  not	  only	  takes	  us	  too	  far	  afield,	  it’s	  also	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  present	  
discussion.	  	  What’s	  crucial	  to	  my	  project	  is	  that	  all	  agree	  that	  what’s	  true	  depends	  on	  how	  things	  are;	  how	  things	  
are	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  what’s	  true.	  	  So,	  e.g.,	  if	  it’s	  true	  that	  if	  Roger	  is	  in	  C,	  then	  he	  would	  A,	  this	  is	  true	  (minimally)	  
because	  I	  would	  A	  if	  I	  was	  in	  C.	  	  Perhaps	  there’s	  more	  that	  can	  be	  said	  about	  how	  this	  (assumed)	  truth	  ‘depends	  
on’	  the	  world,	  but	  it’s	  not	  important	  for	  the	  present	  discussion.	  	  Even	  so,	  for	  a	  thorough	  treatment	  of	  the	  
competing	  theories	  about	  truth,	  see	  Merricks	  (2007).	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To see that TDC is a corollary of the truism about truth, imagine that the proposition that Jones 
kills Smith is true.  Given the truism about truth, that Jones kills Smith is true because Jones kills 
Smith; that is, that Jones kills Smith depends on what Jones does.  And if Jones has a choice 
about whether or not he kills Smith, it seems easily to follow that he has a choice about whether 
or not it’s true that Jones kills Smith.  For, suppose that we thought Jones doesn’t have a choice 
about the truth of that Jones kills Smith.  We’d think this because we’d think Jones doesn’t have 
a choice about whether or not he kills Smith.  So, not only do we see that there’s a close 
connection between ‘having a choice about’ and the nature of truth, we can see that the truism 
about truth reveals a principle about ‘having a choice about’ the truth of a proposition, namely, 
TDC.   
 I think that something similar is true about the relationship between moral responsibility 
and the nature of truth.  To see this, suppose it’s true that Jones kills Smith.  It’s true that Jones 
kills Smith because Jones kills Smith; that is, the truth of that Jones kills Smith depends on Jones 
and what he does.  So, given the truism about truth, it follows that that Jones kills Smith would 
not have been true had Jones not acted as he did. 
 Now, if all of that is right, then I think the truism about truth has the following corollary 
in addition to TDC: 
Truth DependenceMORAL [TDM]: For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S is 
directly morally responsible for that which p’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends 
on’ in which truth depends on the world), then S is at least partly directly morally 
responsible for p’s truth. 
 
And if TDM is a corollary to the truism about truth, then, as I’ll go on to argue, since the truism 
about truth is necessarily true, counterexamples to Rule B are impossible.  To see why I say that 
TDM is a corollary to the truism about truth, notice that given the truism about truth and Jones’s 
moral responsibility for killing Smith, it follows that that Jones kills Smith would not have been 
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true had Jones not acted as he did.  Now, suppose that we thought that Jones isn’t directly 
morally responsible for the fact that Jones kills Smith.  I say we’d think this because we’d think 
that Jones isn’t directly morally responsible for the thing upon which the truth of that Jones kills 
Smith depends, viz., Jones’s killing of Smith.  And this generalizes.  Thus, for all S and all p, if S 
is directly morally responsible for the thing upon which the truth of p depends, then S is at least 
partly directly morally responsible for p’s truth. 
If TDM is true, so I’ll go on to show, then it is impossible to give a counterexample to 
Rule B.  So, what I intend to do in the paper is the following.  First, I will show how TDM’s 
(assumed) truth reveals a way in which two recent alleged counterexamples to Rule B fail.  But 
these reasons will generalize; so, TDM’s (assumed truth) will reveal how all alleged 
counterexamples fail.  Second, I will defend TDM from two objections, one that purports to 
attack TDM indirectly by attacking a principle that TDM allegedly entails, and another that 
attacks TDM directly.  I’ll conclude that these objections fail to undermine TDM; so if TDM is 
true, its truth undermines all attempts to provide a counterexample to Rule B. 
Such conclusion is important.  For, I think that TDM is intuitively plausible. Moreover, I 
think that if the truism about truth is true, then TDM is true.  That is, I think that the truism about 
truth implies TDM.  Thus, to deny TDM (which any compatibilist must, assuming (i) that Rule B 
implies incompatibilism, and (ii) that there can be counterexamples to Rule B if it’s invalid) will 
come at great cost; for, the objector to TDM will have to deny the truism about truth.   
 
II.  Rule B and Some Alleged Counterexamples 
 
 Recall that the Direct Argument depends on the following rule of inference: 
 
Rule B:  From NRp and NR(p ⊃ q), we may infer NRq. 
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This inference rule is the most controversial aspect of the Direct Argument.2  Where ‘NR’ is an 
operator that means ‘nobody is now, or ever has been, even partly directly morally responsible 
for the fact that’, what follows is that, if Rule B is valid, then if you’re not (now or ever) even 
partly directly morally responsible for some fact, p, and you’re not (now or ever) even partly 
directly morally responsible for the fact that p implies some further fact, q, then you’re not (now 
or ever) even partly directly morally responsible for the fact that q.   
Van Inwagen attempts to motivate Rule B with various cases like the following: 
 
Plato:  NR Plato died in antiquity 
 
 NR (Plato died in antiquity ⊃ Plato never met Hume) 
 
 NR Plato never met Hume. (van Inwagen, 1983, p. 187) 
 
And surely the conclusion of Plato—that no one is now (or ever has been, or ever will be) even 
partly directly morally responsible for the fact that Plato never met Hume—follows given the 
truth of the first two steps.  And since Plato is just a substitution instance of Rule B, Rule B 
appears to be valid. 
But, as I say, Rule B is contentious, and lots of ink has been spilt in discussion of this 
controversial inference rule.  So, now I wish to consider two recent alleged counterexamples to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Rule	  B	  is	  the	  most	  controversial	  aspect	  of	  the	  Direct	  Argument,	  but	  there	  are	  other	  objections	  to	  the	  
argument	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  Stephen	  Kearns	  (2011)	  questions	  the	  first	  inference	  rule	  upon	  which	  the	  Direct	  
Argument	  rests;	  namely	  Rule	  A.	  	  Rule	  A	  says	  that	  no	  one	  is	  now	  (or	  ever	  was,	  or	  will	  be)	  even	  partly	  directly	  morally	  
responsible	  for	  a	  necessary	  truth.	  	  Kearns	  attempts	  to	  call	  this	  Rule	  into	  question.	  	  	  
	   Joseph	  Keim	  Campbell	  (2007,	  2008,	  2010)	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  ‘determinism’	  thesis	  
necessarily	  includes	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  remote,	  or	  distant,	  past.	  	  The	  upshot	  of	  Campbell’s	  objection	  is	  that,	  if	  he’s	  right,	  
though	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  still	  goes	  through,	  it	  fails	  to	  establish	  incompatibilism,	  since	  incompatibilism,	  if	  true,	  is	  
necessarily	  true.	  	  But,	  if	  there	  could	  be	  deterministic	  worlds	  that	  don’t	  include	  a	  remote,	  or	  distant,	  past,	  then	  all	  
the	  Direct	  Argument	  establishes	  (if	  it	  establishes	  anything)	  is	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  causal	  determinism	  are	  
incompatible	  in	  worlds	  that	  include	  a	  remote,	  or	  distant,	  past.	  	  But	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  
are	  deterministic	  worlds	  that	  don’t	  include	  a	  remote,	  or	  distant,	  past	  but	  include	  morally	  responsible	  agents.	  	  In	  my	  
dissertation,	  I	  argue	  that	  Kearns’s	  alleged	  counterexamples	  to	  Rule	  A	  fail,	  and	  that,	  while	  Campbell’s	  objection	  
goes	  through,	  it	  can	  be	  met	  by	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  that	  continues	  to	  rely	  on	  both	  Rule	  A	  and	  
Rule	  B.	  	  So,	  Rule	  B’s	  validity	  continues	  to	  be	  important	  to	  a	  properly	  revised	  version	  of	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  for	  
incompatibilism	  about	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  causal	  determinism.	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Rule B.  My aim is to show that counterexamples to Rule B are in fact impossible; so, I use these 
three recent purported counterexamples in order to illustrate this point.  I begin by considering a 
well-known case called ‘Erosion’, introduced by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998).  
Many philosophers think that Erosion decisively tells against Rule B; so, if it fails as a 
counterexample to Rule B, this is important.  Next, I’ll consider another alleged counterexample 
by Ishtiyaque Haji (2010).3  As we’ll see, each case is a different type of alleged counterexample.  
Fischer and Ravizza’s case is a case of overdetermination, while Haji’s case is a case of 
libertarianly free action—that is, a free action done in a non-deterministic universe—where there 
is no overdetermination involved.  Importantly, I’ll show that all of these cases fail to provide a 
counterexample for the same reasons.  Thus, such reasoning will generalize and all alleged 
counterexamples to Rule B will fail.   
I’ll start with Fischer and Ravizza’s attempt to provide a counterexample.  Consider: 
Erosion:  Imagine that Betty [a soldier charged with destroying an enemy fortress] plants 
her explosives in the crevices of the glacier and detonates the charge at T1, causing an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at T3.  Unbeknownst to Betty and her 
commanding officers, however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. 
Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken 
free at T2, starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at T3. 
(Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 157) 
 
Erosion is alleged to be a counterexample to Rule B because 
 
1. The glacier is eroding and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the 
fact that it is eroding; and 
 
2. If the glacier is eroding, then there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, 
and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for this fact; 
 
But, given Betty’s responsibility, it is not true that 
 
3. There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, and no one is, or ever has 
been, even partly responsible for this fact. (Ibid.) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  3	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  many	  other	  attempts	  to	  provide	  a	  counterexample	  to	  Rule	  B.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  David	  Widerker	  
(2002),	  Michael	  McKenna	  (2008),	  Seth	  Shabo	  (2010a;	  2010b),	  Ishtiyaque	  Haji	  (2008;	  2009).	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So, it appears that Rule B is invalid.  For, there are two paths that suffice for the enemy camp’s 
having been crushed by the glacier: one that in fact obtains; the other counterfactual since that 
path didn’t obtain (though it would have).  But, since this counterfactual natural intervener—the 
erosion of the glacier—does not actually cause the avalanche, it does not remove Betty’s moral 
responsibility for the enemy camp’s having been crushed by the glacier.  So, even though the 
enemy camp’s being crushed by the glacier is inevitable, it doesn’t follow that Betty isn’t 
morally responsible for its having been so crushed.  Rule B is invalid. 
 To put the point a bit more clearly, notice that Erosion contains two paths.  The first path 
passes through Betty, a normally functioning agent. The second path, however, does not pass 
through Betty (or any other normally functioning agent).  The second path is merely a 
counterfactual path that Fischer and Ravizza call the ‘Ensuring Path’.  The Ensuring Path, 
obviously enough, ensures that the consequence—in this case, the enemy’s being crushed by the 
glacier—obtains.  So, even though, 
4. There is some Ensuring Path leading to a particular outcome and no one is, or ever 




5. If there is this Ensuring Path, then the outcome is reached, and no one is, or ever has 
been, even partly responsible for this fact; 
 
it does not follow that 
 
6. The outcome is reached and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for 
this fact. 
 
6 doesn’t follow because, since the outcome (the camp’s being destroyed by the glacier) was not 
caused by the natural intervention of ice and rocks breaking free (but, rather, by Betty’s placing 
the dynamite), Betty is responsible for the enemy camp’s having been crushed by the glacier 
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even though this would have happened even if she had never detonated her explosives at T1.  
Rule B is invalid. 
 But I don’t think that Erosion successfully shows that Rule B is invalid; and reflection on 
the truism about truth (§I) will help us to see why.  Recall that it’s true that Turner exists because 
I exist, and it’s true that I write this paper at t because I write this paper at t.  The truism about 
truth asserts just the notion that truth depends on the world in this very trivial way.  And, as I 
argued above, the truism about truth has TDM as a corollary.  
Now, there are objections to TDM (or something like it) in the offing, and I’ll consider 
those in the next section.  For now, however, let’s assume that TDM is true.  Given TDM’s truth, 
does Erosion supply a successful counterexample to Rule B?  I think that it does not. 
 To see why I say this, consider: 
 
1*.  NR The glacier is eroding  
 
2*.  NR (The glacier is eroding ⊃ there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at 
T3) 
 
3*.  NR There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3. 
 
1* – 3* is just 1 – 3 written in the form of Rule B.  And the idea is that, even though 1* and 2* 
are true, 3* is false because Betty is directly morally responsible for the fact that there is an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3.   
 Let’s assume, with Fischer and Ravizza, that Betty is morally responsible for the fact that 
an avalanche crushes the enemy base when it does.  Now, let’s write the equivalent of the 
conditional in 2* as follows: 
2**.  ~ (The glacier is eroding) v (There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at 
T3). 
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Since the first disjunct of 2** is false, we can see that 2** is true just in virtue of the fact that the 
second disjunct is true.4  But notice that 2**’s truth depends on the fact that there is an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3.  Since Betty is, ex hypothesi, morally responsible 
for the fact that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3 because she’s morally 
responsible for the avalanche that crushes the enemy base when it does, we can conclude on the 
basis of TDM that 2* is false.  That is, Betty is morally responsible for the fact expressed in 2** 
because 2**’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends on’ in which truth depends on the 
world) the fact that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, something for 
which Betty is ex hypothesi morally responsible.  Therefore, Betty, contra Fischer and Ravizza’s 
claim, is morally responsible for the fact that lies within the scope of the ‘NR’ operator in 2; and 
so, 2 itself is false.  Thus, Erosion fails as a counterexample to Rule B. 
 Now, Fischer and Ravizza might respond as follows. 
 
You’ve failed to show that Betty is morally responsible for the conditional contained in 2 
because you’ve failed to show that the relevant portion of 2’s truth depends on anything 
that Betty has done.  By hypothesis, that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy 
base at T3 would have been true no matter what Betty did; there was an ‘ensuring 
condition’—namely, the erosion of the glacier—that would have led to the crushing of 
the enemy base even if Betty had never planted the explosive device.  Thus, you’ve failed 
to show that Betty’s actions are what the truth of 2 depends on; so, you’ve failed to show 
that the truth of 2 depends on Betty.  Erosion hasn’t yet been undermined. 
 
But in reply I ask the following question:  Is Betty morally responsible for the fact that there is 
an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, or not?  If she is responsible for the fact that 
there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, and the truth of the conditional that lies 
within the scope of the ‘NR’ operator in 2 depends on this fact, then, given TDM, Betty is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  4	  Widerker	  and	  Schnall	  (forthcoming)	  use	  this	  exact	  move	  against	  Haji’s	  (2009)	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  
counterexample	  to	  Rule	  B.	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morally responsible for the truth of the conditional that lies within the scope of the ‘NR’ operator 
in 2.5  
Now, if Betty isn’t directly morally responsible for the fact that there is an avalanche 
that crushes the enemy base at T3, then, of course, there is no problem for Rule B.  In such a 
case, Rule B is confirmed rather than refuted.  In any case, equipped with TDM, we can see that 
Erosion fails as a counterexample to Rule B. 
 Ishtiyaque Haji (2010) offers the following attempt at a counterexample to Rule B: 
Hal’s Creation:  Hal-2 [an essentially omniscient, sempiternal, amoral—that is, lacks 
knowledge of moral right, wrong, or obligatory—being] has the ability to create (or 
actualize) any one of an infinite number of possible worlds…Suppose Hal-2 creates a 
world, W1, in which, after due reflection, Yasmin [in a libertarianly free way] donates a 
large sum of money (at some time, ts) to a credible charity, UNICEF.  Yasmin really 
cares about the plight of the needy children; she donates because she wishes to help the 
kids and not, for instance, because she wants a big tax break. We safely suppose that she 
is morally praiseworthy for her bountiful donation.  Under appropriate circumstances 
normal agents would be deserving of praise for such an act (Haji, 2010, p. 125). 
 
Hal’s Creation generates the following substitution instance of Rule B: 
Hal’s Argument: 
 
 (4H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1). 
 
 (5H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1	 ⊃	 Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)).	 
	 
	 (6H):  Therefore, NR (Yasmin donates (at ts in W1) (Ibid.). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  5	  Suppose	  that	  TDM	  isn’t	  true.	  	  There	  is	  still	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  Erosion	  provides	  a	  counterexample	  to	  Rule	  B.	  	  
For,	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  3*.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  3*	  is	  that	  it	  misses	  the	  point	  of	  Rule	  B,	  that	  is,	  the	  point	  of	  direct	  
moral	  responsibility.	  	  Following	  David	  Widerker	  (2002),	  we	  can	  think	  of	  direct	  moral	  responsibility	  in	  this	  way:	  “S	  is	  
directly	  responsible	  for	  p	  just	  in	  case	  S	  is	  responsible	  for	  p,	  but	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  responsible	  for	  some	  other	  
fact”	  (Ibid.,	  pp.	  118	  –	  119).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  direct	  moral	  responsibility—the	  relevant	  sort	  of	  responsibility	  to	  which	  
Rule	  B	  applies—is	  the	  sort	  of	  responsibility	  one	  bears	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  some	  morally	  significant	  fact,	  but	  not	  
because	  one	  bears	  responsibility	  for	  it	  in	  virtue	  of	  some	  other	  fact.	  	  Thus,	  Betty	  is	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  
the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  an	  avalanche	  that	  crushes	  the	  enemy	  base	  at	  T3	  only	  if	  she’s	  not	  responsible	  for	  this	  fact	  
because	  of	  her	  responsibility	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  some	  other	  fact.	  	  And	  since	  Betty	  is,	  ex	  hypothesi,	  responsible	  for	  the	  
fact	  that	  there	  is	  an	  avalanche	  that	  crushes	  the	  enemy	  base	  at	  T3	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  caused	  the	  
avalanche,	  she	  is	  not	  directly	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  an	  avalanche	  that	  crushes	  the	  enemy	  base	  at	  T3.	  	  
Thus,	  even	  if	  TDM	  isn’t	  true,	  Erosion	  is	  defeated.	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The upshot of Hal’s Argument is that, since Hal is an amoral agent, 4H is true because neither he 
nor anyone else is morally responsible for the creation of W1; 6H is false because, ex hypothesi, 
Yasmin (libertarianly) freely donates the money at ts in W1 in the right sort of way for moral 
responsibility; but, 5H is true because neither Hal nor Yasmin are morally responsible for the 
fact that (Hal-2 creates W1 ⊃	 Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)). 	 	 
	 Of course, one might object that Yasmin is morally responsible for the truth of the 
conditional that lies within the scope of the ‘NR’ operator in 5H.  But, if so, then Yasmin would 
have to be morally responsible for  
 YC:  Hal-2 creates W1	 ⊃	 at ts Yasmin donates to UNICEF (Ibid., p. 127). 
 
But, thinks Haji, for Yasmin to be morally responsible for YC, she’d have to meet the following  
 
epistemic condition on moral responsibility, namely: 
 
E3:  S is morally praiseworthy [blameworthy] for seeing to the occurrence of state of 
affairs, a, only if S morally ought to have known or believed that a is morally obligatory 
[morally wrong] or, as some might prefer, morally good [morally bad] (in some specified 
sense of ‘good’ [‘bad’] (Ibid.). 
 
And how could Yasmin be expected to meet an epistemic condition like E3 with respect to YC?  
Indeed, “there are no compelling grounds to require that in Hal’s creation, Yasmin ought to have 
known or believed that YC is obligatory or morally good” (Ibid.).  So, Yasmin is not morally 
responsible for YC even though she’s responsible for donating, at ts, to UNICEF.  But, since Hal 
isn’t responsible for YC either, 5H is true.  Thus, thinks Haji, we have a successful 
counterexample to Rule B. 
 But I think that, given TDM, Hal’s Creation does not generate a counterexample to Rule 
B; for, I think that TDM’s truth reveals that 5H is false.  To see that this is so, let’s—as we did 
with the Erosion case—rewrite 5H’s conditional this way: 
 (5H*):  ~ (Hal-2 creates W1) v (Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)). 
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As with 2** from the Erosion case, we can see that since the first disjunct of 5H* is, ex 
hypothesi, false, 5H* is true just in virtue of the truth of the second disjunct.  That is, 5H* is true 
because Yasmin donates to UNICEF when she, in fact, does.  But Yasmin is responsible for this 
fact.  Thus, given TDM, Yasmin is at least partly directly morally responsible for the truth of 
5H*. And if Yasmin is at least partly directly morally responsible for the truth of 5H*, then it 
follows that she’s at least partly directly morally responsible for the truth of the conditional 
contained in 5H of Hal’s Argument.  So, 5H itself is false, and Hal’s Creation is no 
counterexample to Rule B.  
 I’ve shown that Erosion, and Hal’s Creation fail to provide successful counterexamples to 
Rule B if TDM is true.  But it should be clear that I’ve shown more than that.  For, since every 
alleged counterexample to Rule B will have to be of the same form, every alleged 
counterexample to Rule B suffers the same affliction.  Namely, in each case, someone is (or was, 
or will be) ex hypothesi directly morally responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the 
consequent contained within the second premise of each substitution instance of Rule B depends.  
And this means that someone is (or was, or will be) at least partly directly morally responsible 
for the thing upon which the truth of the conditional contained within the second premise of each 
substitution instance of Rule B depends.  Thus, if TDM is true, counterexamples to Rule B are 
impossible.  
 
III.  Is Truth DependenceMORAL True?: Objections to TDM 
  
I will now consider two potential objections to Truth DependenceMORAL.  The first 
objection I’ll consider is from John Martin Fischer and Eleonore Stump (2000) that casts doubt 
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on a principle that TDM seems to entail, and, thus, seems indirectly to attack TDM.  The second 
objection I’ll consider attacks TDM directly. 
In recent work, Fischer and Stump attempt to undermine an argument by Ted Warfield 
(1996).  To begin to see how Fischer and Stump’s potential criticism of TDM will go, consider: 
Erosion*:  [The details are the same as Erosion except that, in this case,] the conditions 
of the glacier do actually cause the ice and rocks to break free, triggering an avalanche 
that arrives at the fortress precisely at the same time as the independent avalanche 
triggered freely by Betty.  Each avalanche is sufficient for the destruction of the enemy 
fortress.6 
 
Fischer and Stump think that Erosion* is a counterexample to Rule B.  Ted Warfield (1996)  
 
seems to agree; so, Warfield constructs the following revision of Rule B, call it: 
 
 Rule Beta ☐:  NRp, ☐ (p ⊃ q)├ NRq 
 
The upshot of Rule Beta ☐ is that it’s supposed to make it much more difficult to construct 
counterexamples like Erosion* because the connection between the eroding glacier at T1 and the 
destruction of the enemy fortress at T3 has to be one of broadly logical necessity.  But, of course 
there is no such connection.   
 Fischer and Stump, however, think that there are counterexamples to Rule Beta ☐ that 
can be constructed, and that don’t presuppose causal determinism.  Consider the following: 
Counterexample B:  [Given the set up of a case like Erosion*] let ‘r’ be a conjunction of 
these propositions: 
 
  (r1) the actual laws of nature obtain, and 
 
  (r3) there is an avalanche, which destroys the enemy camp at T3. 
 
Now, without doubt, there is a logically necessary connection between r and q (since q is 
identical to r3), but the question of whether causal determinism of any sort obtains is 
irrelevant.  Here we have: 
 
(1) NRr, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  6	  Initially	  from	  Mark	  Ravizza	  (1994),	  but	  also	  found	  in	  Fischer	  and	  Ravizza	  (1998,	  p.	  160ff).	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(2) ☐ (r ⊃ q), but it isn’t the case that 
 
(3) NRq. (Fischer and Stump, 2000, p. 50 – 51) 
 
Now, as Fischer and Stump rightly point out, Warfield anticipates this sort of attempt at a  
 
counterexample.  In so doing, he presents a thesis that Fischer and Stump call 
 
(W1):  If no one is even partly morally responsible for a conjunction, then no one is even 
partly morally responsible for either conjunct of the conjunction. (Ibid., p. 51)7 
 
The idea, here, is that if W1 is true, then (1), from Counterexample B, is false since it’s not the 
case that no one is even partly morally responsible for r3, a conjunct of r.  So, (1) is false. 
 But, Fischer and Stump think that such a conclusion is mistaken, and this because of the 
relation between conjunctions and conditionals.  To begin to see the worry, notice that, according 
to the details of Erosion* and Counterexample B, it’s not the case that if the actual laws of nature 
obtain, then there won’t be an avalanche that destroys the enemy base at the time it does.  That 
is: 
(4) ~ ( L ⊃ ~q) 
 
is true.  Moreover, (4) is trivially equivalent to: 
 
(5) (L & q). 
 
Now, Fischer and Stump think that it’s counterintuitive to think that anyone is morally 
responsible for the fact expressed in (5) because it’s strange to think that anyone could be 
morally responsible for the fact expressed in (4).  Thus, Fischer and Stump think there’s a 
problem with accepting a principle like W1.  
 And more problems abound, they claim.  For, if W1 is true, then the following is true, 
too: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     7 But	  originally	  from	  Warfield	  (1996,	  p.	  218).	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(W2):  Given a true antecedent of a conditional, a person is partly morally responsible for 
the conditional’s being false if he is partly responsible for the falsity of the consequent of 
the conditional. (Ibid., p. 52) 
 
Moreover, if W2 is true, then Fischer and Stump think (and I agree) that the following ought to  
 
be true as well: 
 
(W3):  Given a true antecedent of a conditional, a person is partly responsible for the 
conditional’s being true if he is partly responsible for the truth of the consequent of the 
conditional.  (Ibid.)  
 
Thus, if W1 is true, then W3 is true.  This, Fischer and Stump conclude, is an untoward 
consequence of accepting a principle like W1.   
 If W1 entails W3, then one way to show that W1 is false is by showing that W3 is false.  
This is exactly what Stump and Fischer attempt to do.  To see why Fischer and Stump think that 
W3 is false, recall: 
(2): ☐ (r ⊃ q). 
 
Now, by Rule A of the Direct Argument—which says that no one can be even partly directly 
morally responsible for a necessary truth—we get the fact that nobody is even partly directly 
morally responsible for the fact expressed in (2).  (2), after all, is a necessary truth; for it’s just 
trivial that, necessarily, the conjunction of the actual laws of nature and q implies q.  But, if W3 
is right, then it follows that someone is morally responsible for the fact expressed in (2); Betty is 
responsible for the fact expressed in (2) because she’s responsible for q, and (2)’s truth depends 
on q’s being true.  So, Warfield is left with a dilemma: either Rule A—the Direct Argument’s 
inference rule that says no one is (or could be) even partly directly morally responsible for a 
necessary truth—is false, or W3 is false.  If W3 is false, then W1 is false, and Warfield’s defense 
Rule Beta ☐ fails.  On either horn, the Direct Argument gets skewered.   
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 Moreover, Truth DependenceMORAL appears to entail W3.  For, W3, so the objection 
goes, merely expresses one way in which a person can be responsible for the truth of a 
proposition: if a conditional has a true antecedent, and a person is directly morally responsible 
for the truth of the consequent, then the person is at least partly directly morally responsible for 
the truth of the conditional.  If this is what TDM entails, and if Fischer and Stump’s objections to 
W3 go through, then TDM is defeated. 
 But I think that Fisher and Stump’s argument against W3 does not defeat TDM; for, I 
think that W3 is not entailed by TDM.  In what remains of this section, I will defend TDM from 
the claim that it entails W3.   
 To begin to see how my defense will go, recall: 
 
 (2): ☐ (r ⊃ q). 
 
(2) expresses the following fact: 
 
DEB:  Necessarily, if the actual laws of nature obtain and the enemy base is crushed by 
an avalanche at T3, then the enemy base is crushed by an avalanche at T3. 
 
Fischer and Stump think that, if W3 is true, then it follows that someone—namely, Betty—is 
responsible for DEB.  And, so the objection continues, since TDM entails W3, it follows by 
TDM that Betty is responsible for DEB, a necessary truth.  Thus, if TDM is true, Rule A is false.   
But, I think that this claim is too hasty; for, DEB’s truth doesn’t depend on Betty.  For, 
DEB is true even if it isn’t the case that the enemy base is crushed when it, in fact, is.  Indeed it’s 
difficult to say just what DEB’s truth does depend on; it’s a trivial truth.  This is important: TDM 
speaks in terms of being responsible for a proposition whose truth depends on what an agent 
does.  But DEB’s truth is not like this; it does not depend on Betty or what she does.   
Why do I say that DEB’s truth (and, so, (2)’s truth) doesn’t depend on Betty?  Well, for 
one thing, DEB is true even if it isn’t the case that the enemy base is crushed when it in fact is.  
	   19	  
Moreover, DEB’s truth doesn’t depend on Betty in the relevant way—the way relevant for moral 
responsibility—because it’s true regardless of how things are.  But, if DEB’s truth is to depend 
on Betty in the relevant way, this can’t be the case; it has to be that DEB’s truth hinges on 
whether or not things are a certain way; viz., that things are such that Betty acts in a particular 
way.  Or another way to put the point is this: some truths require a truthmaker; I think that DEB 
is not one of those, but even if it is, Betty is not its truthmaker.  So, DEB’s truth doesn’t depend 
on Betty.  But, since TDM requires that DEB’s truth depend on Betty (or someone, anyway) in 
order for her (or anyone) to be directly morally responsible for its truth, even if W3 is false, 
TDM is unharmed.    
 Now, I agree that TDM entails a principle similar to W3, but I argue that any such 
principle must have an appeal to the relevant notion of dependence.  For, suppose that it’s true 
that if hobbits don’t exist, then I write this paper.  Given that it’s true that hobbits don’t exist, the 
foregoing conditional is true if and only if I write this paper.  Thus, I’m responsible for the 
conditional’s being true if and only if I write this paper.  Now, suppose that I’m not responsible 
for its being true that if hobbits don’t exist, then I write this paper.  If I’m not responsible for the 
truth of this conditional, then this is because I’m not responsible for writing this paper; that is, 
I’m not responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the conditional depends.  Thus, I 
conclude that any W3-like principle that TDM entails must include the relevant notion of 
dependence. 
I agree with Charles Hermes (forthcoming) that “any plausible account of moral 
responsibility must make the following disjunction principle true:” 
DPR:  If a disjunction has only one true disjunct, and an agent is responsible for the truth 
of that disjunct, then the agent is responsible for the truth of the disjunction. (Ibid) 
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Here is Hermes’s justification for thinking that DPR is a required inference for any plausible 
account of moral responsibility: 
[S]uppose that Mary knows that one of her two children broke her favorite vase and 
wants to know who is responsible.  Mary would discover what she wanted to know by 
learning that Johnny is the only person responsible for breaking the vase.  After all, if 
Johnny is the only person responsible for breaking the vase, then Johnny is also 
responsible for the fact that one of her children broke the vase.  It is easy to see how 
Mary can derive this conclusion, if DPR is valid.  If DPR is invalid, Mary’s inference 
appears to be equally problematic. (Ibid.) 
 
Or think of it this way.  Suppose that I murder Jones.  By murdering Jones I am obviously 
morally responsible for the fact that Roger murders Jones; however, I am also morally 
responsible for the fact that one of the people at the University of Tennessee murders Jones.  So, 
I agree that any plausible account of moral responsibility will make DPR true, but this is because 
I think that DPR contains within it an implicit appeal to the relevant notion of dependence to 
which TDM refers.  For suppose it’s true that ~p v q (and p is true).  This disjunction is true just 
because q is true; that is, this disjunction depends on q in the sense of ‘depends on’ in which 
truth depends on the world.  So, DPR contains an implicit appeal to the relevant notion of 
dependence to which TDM refers.  Moreover, if DPR is true, then Rule B is established and with 
it the Direct Argument.   
 But W3 is not like DPR in its appeal to the relevant notion of dependence.  Thus, I 
conclude that TDM does not entail W3; it entails a restricted W3, one that appeals to the relevant 
notion of ‘dependence’ to which TDM refers.  Thus, Fischer and Stump’s argument against W3 
fails to show that TDM is false.  
To see what I take to be a more worrisome objection to TDM, consider: 
Zombie Case: Sara does cutting edge scientific research. She knows her craft well. She 
fulfills the requisite requirements to be morally responsible for her research, and reports 
her research to her boss, Ted. Unbeknownst to Sara, however, Ted is a mastermind 
controlling a large conglomerate of labs. Ted uses Sara’s work, along with the work of 
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many other scientists (whose work we can safely assume Sara would not grasp), to create 
a virus that, when released, turns half of the world into flesh-eating zombies. Sara bears 
moral responsibility for a part of the way things are: namely, that her research took place. 
But Sara doesn’t bear part of the moral responsibility for the way things are. It would be 
inappropriate to blame Sara for the zombie outbreak. Plausibly, Sara is non-culpably 
ignorant, and so gets off the hook.8 
 
The Zombie Case is, I think, supposed to show that someone could be morally responsible for 
some fact but lack the epistemic requirements for responsibility with respect to the ‘dependent’ 
fact.  So, for example, Sara bears moral responsibility for the fact that her research took place, 
but it’s alleged that she bears no responsibility for the fact that her research took place and 
there’s a zombie outbreak, and this is because she doesn’t have any good reason to believe that 
the truth of this second fact—this conjunctive fact—depends on her.   
 But, I think that this objection can be met with the following story.  Suppose that I am a 
mason, tasked with the making, and laying, of a single brick that’s part of the foundation of a 
beautiful mansion.  And suppose that my creating and laying this brick is, other things equal, a 
morally praiseworthy action.  Now, suppose, also, that all I know how to do, at least when it 
comes to building things, is make and lay bricks; I don’t know anything about engineering, blue-
prints, or anything else relevant to the task of building a house.  Moreover, I’m not so much as 
capable of knowing such things (for whatever reason).  According to TDM, if I’m directly 
morally responsible for the fact that this particular brick is made and the truth of that this 
particular brick is made and the beautiful mansion is built depends on whether or not I make this 
particular brick, then I’m at least partly directly morally responsible for this conjunctive fact; I’m 
partly directly morally responsible for the fact that things are such that that this particular brick 
is made and the beautiful mansion is built. 
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 Now, suppose that the homeowner, the person who designed the house and 
commissioned me to build and lay the single brick, came to me and thanked me for the fact that 
her house is built.  That is, suppose the homeowner thanked me in such a way as to be a type of 
moral praise given to me for the fact that her home is built.  Is the homeowner out of line?  Has 
she gotten her wires crossed with respect to whom she ought to praise for the building of her 
house?  I don’t see any obvious reason to think the answer to either of these questions is ‘yes’.  
Indeed, it seems perfectly natural for the homeowner to thank me in this way since her home’s 
being built the way it was (we may assume) wasn’t so much as possible without my having 
constructed the relevant brick.  And this seems true to me regardless of whether or not I 
understood (or could understand) the larger state of affairs of which my constructing the brick 
was a part.   
 But suppose that the homeowner is out of line.  Does this show that TDM is false?  I 
think that it does not.  For, TDM doesn’t imply that I am responsible for the fact that her house is 
built; rather, TDM implies that I am responsible for the fact that this particular brick is made 
and her house is built.   
So, it seems to me that meeting the epistemic conditions for responsibility for the making 
of the brick suffices for meeting the epistemic conditions for responsibility for the whole of 
which the brick plays a part.  Moreover, I think that this objection confuses what’s at issue.  
TDM doesn’t imply that a person is responsible for all of the conjuncts in a conjunction, for 
example.  Nor does it imply that a person is responsible for the antecedent in a conditional.  All it 
implies is that a person is responsible for the truth of the conjunction, or the truth of the 
conditional (or, etc.) given that the truth of those things depends on what they do.  For, suppose 
it’s true that Sara’s research took place.  Now, suppose that Sara isn’t responsible for this fact.  I 
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think the only thing to conclude here is that she’s not responsible for this fact because she’s not 
responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the proposition depends, viz., doing her 
research.  But this is just to say that if she’s responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the 
proposition depends, then she’s responsible for the truth of the proposition.  And given the 
Zombie Case, the truth of the proposition that her research took place and there’s a zombie 
outbreak depends on what Sara does.  Thus, though Sara is responsible for the fact that her 
research took place and there’s a zombie outbreak, it doesn’t follow that she’s at all responsible 
for the fact that there’s a zombie outbreak.9  And it seems to me that this is what the Zombie 
Case is supposed to elicit.   
Thus, I conclude that TDM is safe from these objections.  Moreover, I can’t think of any 
better objections to TDM than what I’ve here considered.  So, I think that TDM is safe from 
objection, full stop.  And if TDM is safe, then counterexamples to Rule B are impossible. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
 This is a truism about truth: that dogs bark is true because dogs bark; that I write this 
paper at t is true because I write this paper at t, and so on.  I follow Trenton Merricks (2007, 
2009, 2011a, 2011b) when I say that that truth depends on the world and not the other way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  9	  Objection:	  Doesn’t	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak	  depend	  on	  Sara?	  	  If	  so,	  then,	  by	  TDM,	  isn’t	  Sara	  
at	  least	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak?	  	  If	  your	  answer	  is	  yes	  to	  
either	  of	  these,	  then	  the	  Zombie	  Case	  is,	  contrary	  to	  what	  you	  say,	  a	  counterexample	  to	  TDM.	  
	  	  
Reply:	  	  No,	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  what	  Sara	  does.	  	  At	  least,	  it	  does	  not	  
depend	  on	  what	  Sara	  does	  in	  the	  relevant	  way.	  	  Recall	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘dependence’	  at	  issue	  in	  TDM	  is	  the	  very	  
trivial	  sort	  of	  dependence	  in	  which	  truth	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is.	  	  So:	  is	  it	  true	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  
outbreak	  if	  and	  only	  if	  Sara	  does	  her	  research?	  	  According	  to	  the	  details	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  answer	  must	  be	  no	  (e.g.,	  
Sara’s	  boss’s	  nefarious	  plan	  plays	  a	  part,	  etc.).	  	  There	  are,	  presumably,	  very	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  could	  be	  true	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak.	  	  Thus,	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak	  does	  not	  depend	  
on	  Sara—not,	  anyway,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘dependence’	  at	  issue	  in	  TDM.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Zombie	  Case	  is	  no	  counterexample	  
to	  TDM.	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around denotes just this truism, the truism about truth.  But this truism, I claimed, has the 
following corollary: 
Truth DependenceMORAL [TDM]: For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S is 
directly morally responsible for that which a p’s truth depends on (in the sense of 
‘depends on’ in which truth depends on the world), then S is directly morally responsible 
for that p’s truth. 
 
If I’m right about this, then accepting the truism about truth requires accepting TDM; and 
denying TDM requires rejecting the truism about truth.  But no one should reject the truism 
about truth; so, no one should reject TDM. 
But, if TDM is right, then counterexamples to Rule B—the Direct Argument’s most 
contentious transfer principle—are impossible.  I argued for this claim by, first, showing that two 
recent attempts to provide a counterexample (Erosion, and Hal’s Creation) fail to so provide 
given the truth of TDM.  Moreover, I argued that TDM’s truth shows more than the failure of 
Erosion and Hal’s Creation.  It shows that any alleged counterexample to Rule B will fail.  For, 
any purported counterexample to Rule B will have the same form.   
The form of any alleged counterexample to Rule B will go as follows: by hypothesis, no 
one is (or was, or ever will be) even partly directly morally responsible for the propositions 
governed by the ‘NR’ operator in the first two premises of the substitution instance of Rule B.  
But someone is, by hypothesis, at least partly directly morally responsible for the proposition 
governed by the ‘NR’ operator in the conclusion of the substitution instance of Rule B.  But, if 
TDM is true, then counterexamples of this form (which is all of them!) will fail.  For, the truth of 
the conditional in the second premise depends on what the agent in question does.  Thus, in all 
attempts to give a counterexample to Rule B, someone is at least partly directly morally 
responsible for the truth of the conditional in the second premise.  Thus, if TDM is true, then it’s 
impossible to give a substitution instance of Rule B where the conclusion is false but the 
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premises are true.  Which is just to say that if TDM is true, then it’s impossible to give a 
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